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Abstract
Background: A coordinated response to HIV/AIDS remains one of the ‘grand challenges’ facing policymakers
today. Global health initiatives (GHIs) have the potential both to facilitate and exacerbate coordination at the
national and subnational level. Evidence of the effects of GHIs on coordination is beginning to emerge but has
hitherto been limited to single-country studies and broad-brush reviews. To date, no study has provided a focused
synthesis of the effects of GHIs on national and subnational health systems across multiple countries. To address
this deficit, we review primary data from seven country studies on the effects of three GHIs on coordination of
HIV/AIDS programmes: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the World Bank’s HIV/AIDS programmes including the Multi-country AIDS Programme
(MAP).
Methods: In-depth interviews were conducted at national and subnational levels (179 and 218 respectively) in
seven countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and South America, between 2006 and 2008. Studies explored the
development and functioning of national and subnational HIV coordination structures, and the extent to which
coordination efforts around HIV/AIDS are aligned with and strengthen country health systems.
Results: Positive effects of GHIs included the creation of opportunities for multisectoral participation, greater
political commitment and increased transparency among most partners. However, the quality of participation was
often limited, and some GHIs bypassed coordination mechanisms, especially at the subnational level, weakening
their effectiveness.
Conclusions: The paper identifies residual national and subnational obstacles to effective coordination and optimal
use of funds by focal GHIs, which these GHIs, other donors and country partners need to collectively address.
Background
A coordinated response to HIV/AIDS remains one of
the ‘grand challenges’ facing policy makers today [1]. As
the number of global health actors continues to prolifer-
ate exponentially, one particular set of actors - global
health initiatives (GHIs) - has the potential both to facil-
itate and exacerbate coordination. New actors bring new
resources for health, increased flexibility and creativity,
all of which require coordination. However, the diversity
and complexity of relations amongst multiple actors - a
hallmark of GHIs - may also weaken already fragile
health systems, thereby undermining their efficiency,
effectiveness and equity [2-5].
Whilst single country studies and broad-brush reviews
are starting to reveal the complex relationship between
GHIs and efforts to coordinate the HIV/AIDS response
[6,7], synthesis of primary data from multiple countries
is required to identify cross-country challenges and les-
sons learned. This study fills this knowledge gap by pre-
senting a synthesis of primary data from seven country
studies on the effects of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
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Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the World Bank’s
HIV/AIDS programmes including the Multi-country
AIDS Programme (MAP).
At the global level consensus has emerged about the
need to improve coordination of health and HIV-speci-
fic programmes [8-10]. Several initiatives have aimed at
improving coordination (Table 1). In 2004, the UNAIDS
‘Three Ones’ principles called for one national AIDS
coordinating body, while in 2005 both the Paris Declara-
tion on Aid Effectiveness and the Global Task Team on
Improving AIDS Coordination among Multilateral Insti-
tutions and International Donors (GTT) reported on
how actors within the new global health architecture
might better coordinate their activities. Buoyant with a
new-found enthusiasm for coordination, a flurry of
international activity in 2007 led to the establishment of
the Global Implementation Support Team, the Global
Campaign for the Health MDGs, and the International
Health Partnership (IHP) - all calling for better coordi-
nation to achieve improved health outcomes.
At the country level the need for a coordinated HIV/
AIDS response is also recognised as urgent, and numer-
ous country-level programmes and reforms have been
implemented with varying degrees of success (Table 1).
Beginning in the late 1980s with the WHO’s Global Pro-
gramme on AIDS - the genesis of many current
National AIDS Commissions (NAC) or their equivalents
- efforts to coordinate were given a boost in 2002 with
the introduction of the Global Fund’s Country Coordi-
nating Mechanism (CCM). Established to coordinate
country-funding proposals and broaden cooperation and
participation in decision-making, early experiences were
mixed: some CCMs integrated with NACs, others devel-
oped complementary roles, and some were reported to
be competing for the same resources [11,12]. In 2006
the UN’sr e p o r tDelivering as One added emphasis to
the need for better country coordination by outlining a
series of reforms to streamline the work of UN agencies
operating at country level [13], and by 2009 Country
Health Sector Teams were being developed through the
IHP as a way to bring civil society and non-state actors
into the coordination process [14].
T h ei n t r o d u c t i o no fG H I ss u c ha st h eG l o b a lF u n d ,
PEPFAR and the World Bank’sM u l t i - c o u n t r yA I D S
Programme have important implications for these and
other efforts at improving coordination of health pro-
grammes. While they have diverse governance arrange-
ments - PEPFAR is a bilateral programme, the Global
Fund is a public-private partnership and the World
Bank is a multilateral agency - their common feature is
the extent to which they have mobilised substantial
resources for HIV/AIDS control in multiple countries.
Brugha defines a GHI as: ‘ab l u e p r i n tf o rf i n a n c i n g ,
resourcing, coordinating and/or implementing disease
control across at least several countries in more than one
region of the world’ [15]. Indeed these GHIs have mobi-
lised unprecedented levels of funds for diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis and engendered
increased political attention and widened stakeholder
engagement for disease control [6,16]. The Global Fund,
for example, has rapidly scaled up its funding from less
than 1% of total development assistance for health in
2002 to 8·3% in 2007, with total approved funding of
15.6B [17,18]. PEPFARhascommittedover 3.8B in funds
for HIV/AIDS programmes globally [19].
Concerns have been raised about how well GHI pro-
grammes are coordinated and aligned with health sys-
tems, and whether they have exaggerated problems of
weak health systems in some cases. Some GHIs have
required countries receiving funds to establish new
coordination structures, as in the case of the Global
Fund; others, such as PEPFAR, have operated relatively
independently of national coordination systems. In the
first, and to date only, systematic review of GHIs, the
Global Fund was credited with expanding stakeholder
engagement, notably civil society participation in CCMs,
although in some countries governments dominated
CCM decision making while sideling civil society and
private sector actors [6]. While the Global Fund has
since introduced tighter conditions stipulating the inclu-
sion of these groups [20,21], CCMs have also been criti-
cised for duplicating existing coordination structures,
thereby adding to an already complex health governance
architecture, and for failing to engender effective com-
munication and trust between members [11,22-25]. PEP-
FAR has been criticised in particular for limited
Table 1 Global and country level initiatives, agreements
and processes to promote coordination of health
programmes
Global level
2004 UN ‘3 Ones’ Principles
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
2005 Global Task Team on Improving AIDS Coordination among
Multilateral Institutions and International Donors
2007 Global Implementation Support Team
2007 Global Campaign for the Health MDGs
2007 International Health Partnership (IHP) Global Compact
Country level
1980s to
date
National AIDS Commissions (NACs) or equivalent
1997 Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs)
Poverty Reduction Strategies
2001 Global Fund Country Coordination Mechanisms
2006 One-UN - ‘Delivering as One’
2008/9 International Health Partnership (IHP) Country Compacts
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Page 2 of 16transparency, and a lack of willingness to coordinate
with other donors [26,27], although the new Obama
administration has pledged to revise PEPFAR’sC o u n t r y
Operation Plans to ensure better coordination with
country governments and donors [10].
Ten years have passed since the launch of the World
Bank’s Multi-country AIDS Programme, and almost five
years since PEPFAR was launched. The Global Fund’s
Technical Evaluation Reference Group (TERG) has just
completed its Five Year Evaluation, and findings from
primary research about the effects of GHIs on health
systems at national and subnational levels are beginning
to be reported [27-39]. It is therefore an appropriate
time to revisit and review the effects that GHIs provid-
ing large levels of funds to HIV/AIDS control are having
on coordination efforts in-country. Most studies have
been located in Africa and have focused on the national
level. Now that GHIs are well established, knowledge is
needed on their effects across more diverse country set-
tings, and at subnational as well as national levels. This
paper addresses some of these knowledge gaps by pre-
senting a synthesis of empirical findings on the effects
of three GHIs for HIV/AIDS across seven countries.
While the results fill some gaps, what is striking from
o u rf i n d i n g si st h ep a u c i t yo fd a t ai ns o m ea r e a s ,i n
some countries, and for some - though not all - of the
initiatives; but we argue that this is an important finding
in its own right and that there remains an important
n e e df o ro n g o i n gs t u d i e so nt h ee f f e c t so fG H I so n
country health systems as these initiatives mature.
Based on empirical evidence from country studies
forming part of the Global HIV/AIDS Initiatives Net-
work (GHIN) http://www.ghinet.org, this paper explores
the effects on subnational and national coordination
structures of three GHIs for HIV/AIDS control that col-
lectively contribute more than two thirds of external
funding for HIV/AIDS programmes [40]: the Global
Fund, PEPFAR, and the HIV/AIDS programmes that
form a part of the World Bank’sH e a l t hN u t r i t i o na n d
Population (HNP) programme including the Multi-
country AIDS Programme (MAP). Table 2 summarises
the key features of each of these initiatives. The paper
synthesises empirical qualitative data from seven country
studies: two from Europe (Georgia and Ukraine); two
from Africa (Mozambique and Zambia); two from Asia
(China and Kyrgyzstan); and one from Latin America
(Peru). These country studies were selected on the basis
that: a) they were members of the GHIN network, and
b) they had explored coordination as part of their study.
Reports for the studies conducted in the seven countries
are accessible at http://www.ghinet.org/[28-39]. Key
reports are referenced fully in this article. The Peru
research team has also published some of their findings
at http://www.iessdeh.org/usuario/ftp/final%20ghin.pdf
The paper has the following objectives:
▪ To assess progress towards the Three Ones princi-
ple of creating one national AIDS coordination
authority by mapping national and subnational coor-
dination structures with a remit for HIV/AIDS
across the seven countries;
▪ To identify how the above GHIs - where present -
have affected national and subnational HIV/AIDS
coordination structures including their creation,
broad participation and effective functioning;
▪ To assess what has been achieved in terms of the
functioning of national and subnational coordination
structures and identify what problems remain.
Table 3 summarises GHI HIV/AIDS programmes in
the seven countries together with selected indicators of
HIV/AIDS; the table shows there is substantial diversity
across these countries in terms of GHI country pre-
sence, epidemiological status (low level, concentrated or
generalised epidemics) and amount of HIV/AIDS-related
funding received.
Table 2 Focal GHIs for HIV/AIDS
Global Fund PEPFAR World Bank MAP
Type of
organisation
Public-private partnership Bilateral donor Multilateral agency
Date commenced 2002 2003 2000
Disease focus HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS
Priorities Set by country stakeholders
presented through proposals
Priorities and targets set by US Congress Based on national HIV/
AIDS strategic plans
Management
approach
Country Coordination Mechanisms
and Local Fund Agents
National AIDS Council/secretariat Coordinated through US
embassies
Main recipients Government, civil society, private for
profit
Mainly US and international NGOs disburse to local NGO
sub-recipients; small government grants
Government ministries,
NGOs
Funds disbursed
2003 (2006)
$789.1 M ($1031.3 M) $949.2 M ($2517.6 M) $307.7 M ($36.1 M)
Source: adapted from Biesma et al 2009 [21]
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Page 4 of 16The study embraces both deductive and inductive
approaches to thematic analysis: we tested the impor-
tance of the key factors relating to the effective func-
tioning of coordination structures identified in the
literature in the seven country settings; additionally we
identified and explored themes emerging from the
country data. The literature to date defines the effective
functioning of national coordination mechanisms
including Global Fund CCMs in different ways
[2,9,20,24,41-43].
￿ inclusive stakeholder representation across govern-
ment departments;
￿ strong civil society engagement;
￿ appropriate level of membership;
￿ strong and effective leadership;
￿ authority and strong country ownership;
￿ alignment with other coordination structures;
￿ clear functions and mandates;
￿ clarity over structure, operating procedures and
terms of reference;
￿ sufficient secretariat capacity; and
￿ effective communication between members.
Informed by these studies and the major issues
grounded in the findings of the seven country studies
we developed a health systems analytical framework
( F i g u r e1 )t h a tc a p t u r e sa )G H I sa n do t h e rf i n a n c e r so f
country HIV/AIDS programmes; b) aspects of the func-
tioning of national and subnational coordination struc-
tures; c) and the effects of coordination structure
functioning on programme coordination. Less data were
available from these studies relating to c) the effects of
coordination structures on programme delivery and
health outcomes. While it has been widely accepted that
improved coordination can lead to better efficiency,
effectiveness, equity and sustainability of health and
other programmes [2,44], this remains an area where
further research is required.
Methods
This paper draws on data generated from semi-struc-
tured interviews conducted by country teams with stake-
holders from government agencies, civil society
organisations (CSOs) and international partners at
national and subnational levels between 2006 and 2008
in China (national and subnational n = 20; government
n = 14, CSOs n = 4, international partners n = 2), Geor-
gia (national n = 24; government n = 14, CSOs n = 3,
international partners n = 7), Kyrgyzstan (national n =
36, subnational n = 60; government n = 41, CSOs n =
36, international partners n = 19), Mozambique
(national n = 21; government n = 7, CSO n = 3, interna-
tional n = 11), Peru (national n = 32; government n =
GHI financing 
for country 
HIV/AIDS 
programmes  
National coordination structure 
functioning  
- Participation & membership 
- Country ownership 
- Leadership & political commitment  
- Capacity, roles & communication  
Proliferation 
of national 
and sub-
nation 
coordination 
structures for 
HIV/AIDS 
Effects on 
programmatic 
coordination 
- Multi-sectoral 
 decision making  
- Harmonisation & 
 alignment 
- Oversight & 
 M&E   
- Coordinated 
 service delivery  
Bilateral & 
international 
donor 
financing for 
country 
HIV/AIDS 
programmes  
Sub-national coordination 
structure functioning  
- Participation & membership 
- Country ownership 
- Leadership & political commitment  
- Capacity, roles & communication  
Government 
financing for 
country 
HIV/AIDS 
programmes  
Figure 1 Framework for assessing the effects of global HIV/AIDS initiatives on country coordination structures.
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Page 5 of 1612, CSOs n = 12, international partners n = 8), Ukraine
(national n = 30, subnational n = 105; government n =
37, CSOs n = 81, international partners n = 17) and
Zambia (national n = 16, subnational n = 53; govern-
ment n = 30, CSOs n = 35, international partners n =
4). Respondents, sampled purposively based on their
involvement with GHI HIV/AIDS programmes, included
government decision makers, international development
partners, GHI programme implementers, HIV/AIDS ser-
vice managers and other key informants in the HIV/
AIDS-related field.
Based on these semi-structured interviews the studies
aimed to elicit: a) information on the existence of
national and subnational HIV/AIDS coordination struc-
tures, b) stakeholders’ knowledge and experience of the
effects of the focal GHIs on country health and HIV/
AIDS systems including national and subnational coor-
dination structures, c) key factors enabling and inhibit-
ing the effective functioning of these coordination
structures that remain despite (or resulting from) GHI-
financed programmes, and d) key problems that inhibit
the effective functioning of national and subnational
coordination structures.
Each country team undertook systematic thematic
analyses of their qualitative data, which were presented
in country reports and supported by GHIN researchers
at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
and the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland. These
findings were then drawn on to produce a comparative
synthesis across the seven countries also utilising a the-
matic analysis approach [45]. The synthesis, which was
led by the London and Dublin teams, adopted an inves-
tigator triangulation approach whereby multiple
researchers contributed to analysing the findings in
order to reduce personal bias and improve the internal
validity of the synthesis. The synthesis involved:
1. Initial reading of all study reports and summaries of
findings by the first analyst from the London team;
2. The London and Dublin teams met to agree a com-
mon analytical framework consisting of thematic
headers;
3. Cross-country findings were systematically analysed
by the first analyst with support from the Dublin team:
findings were extracted from all study reports according
to the common analytical framework and summaries of
major findings tabulated;
4. Tables were reviewed by country teams to confirm
the interpretation of each study’sf i n d i n g sa n di n p u t
further study data where appropriate;
5. The paper was drafted by the first analyst and cir-
culated to the London and Dublin teams for comment
on its clarity on coherence;
6. The draft paper was reviewed by country teams to
confirm accuracy of the representation of study findings
and comment on its clarity on coherence, and the
synthesis was agreed.
Ethical approval for the study complying with the Hel-
sinki Declaration was granted by the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and by appropriate
ethics committees in the countries where the studies
took place where they exist.
Results
Proliferation of national and subnational HIV/AIDS
coordination structures
A mapping of HIV/AIDS coordination structures at
national and subnational levels shows that the architec-
ture of HIV/AIDS governance in the seven study coun-
tries has increased in complexity. As Table 4 illustrates,
in parallel to growing numbers of donors and initiatives
financing HIV/AIDS programmes, new HIV/AIDS coor-
dination structures have been introduced at national
and subnational levels. NACs or their equivalent were in
place in all seven countries before they received Global
Fund HIV/AIDS grants. In some cases, multiple struc-
tures now exist at national and subnational levels either
focussing on HIV/AIDS, or with HIV/AIDS a major
remit. It appears that the seven countries have some
w a yt og ob e f o r er e a l i s i n gt h eU N A I D S‘Three Ones’
principle that calls for one multi-sectoral national body
for HIV/AIDS coordination (Table 4).
In China, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, Ukraine and
Zambia, Global Fund programmes stimulated the intro-
duction of new HIV/AIDS coordination structures: in
addition to national CCMs, subnational coordination
structures have been created to coordinate local HIV/
AIDS programmes [28-39]. In some countries, formal
and informal structures and arrangements were initiated
by civil society organisations (CSOs), governments and
donors, although most were short-lived. Government
and donor structures, for example, have consisted of
loose coalitions of actors holding a one-off or time-lim-
ited series of meetings around particular issues/deci-
sions. The HIV/AIDS architecture in Kyrgyzstan, which
has a relatively low HIV prevalence (Table 4), provides
ample illustration of this point. The country has formal
coordination structures with a remit for HIV existing at
four levels (national, regional, municipal and district-
level), and structures in parallel to these including a
national level NGO Steering Group; donor forums
focusing on HIV/AIDS programme coordination; an
Intersectoral Steering Group on Health Protection and
Social Care in the Penal Enforcement System; and sev-
eral local structures such as a Working Group in the
Osh region which has the highest HIV prevalence in the
country [28,29].
The studies in Mozambique, China and Ukraine in
particular suggest that the multiplicity of parallel
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Page 6 of 16Table 4 HIV/AIDS coordination structures in seven case study countries
Country First national coordination
structure with a remit for
HIV/AIDS*
Year CCM
was
established
Current national
coordination structures
with a remit for HIV/
AIDS*
Other national- level
coordination structures with a
remit for HIV/AIDS
Subnational
coordination
structures with a
remit for HIV/AIDS
China State Council Coordinating
Mechanism for STIs and AIDS
(1996)
2002 State Council AIDS Working
Committee Office
(SCAWCO) (2004)
-Most ministries have established
HIV/AIDS coordination
committees
-The National Centre for AIDS/STD
Prevention ontrol (NCAIDS),
created in 1998 & integrated with
Chinese CDC
-AIDS Working
Committees
-AIDS Prevention &
Control Lead
Groups
Georgia Governmental Commission on
HIV/AIDS/STI & other Socially
Dangerous Diseases (1996)
2003 Country Coordination
Mechanism (2003)
-National Centre for Diseases
Control & Public Health
-Prevention Task Force (PTF), est.
under the USAID funded STI/HIV
Prevention Project (UN agencies &
national and international CSOs)
N/A
Kyrgyzstan UN Thematic Group on HIV/
AIDS (1996)
2001 Multisectoral Country
Coordination Committee on
Socially Significant Diseases
& Especially Dangerous
Diseases (2007)
-HIV/AIDS service CSOs Steering
Group
-Intersectoral Steering Group on
Health Protection & Social Care in
Penal Enforcement System
- UN HIV/AIDS Theme Group
-Regional &
municipal level HIV/
AIDS coordination
committees
-Regional,
municipal, district
health coordination
committees
-CSO Working
Group on
Prevention of HIV/
AIDS epidemic
(Osh)
Mozambique National STI/HIV/AIDS Control
Programme within the Ministry
of Health
2002 National AIDS Council (NAC)
(2000)
-HIV/AIDS Partners Forum (link
between NAC secretariat &
donors)
-Network of International CSOs
working on Health & HIV/AIDS
(NAIMA)
MONASO: Network of national
CSOs working on HIV/AIDS
RENSIDA: National Network of
PLWHA Associations
CCM for Global Fund which
meets mainly for project proposal
review
Health SWap: Sectoral
Coordination Committee (’comite
de coordenacao sectorial’ (CCS),
Joint Coordinating Committee
(’sectoral co-ordination
committee’) (CCC), HIV/AIDS WGs/
Taskforces
-Pre-partners forum
(for HIV/AIDS)
-Health Partners
Group (for Health
Sector)
Peru Technical Commission for
Notification & Registry
2002 Country Coordination
Mechanism: National
Multisectoral Coordination
Commission on Health
(2000)
Multisectoral National
Coordination Committee on
Health (Global Fund projects)
Multisectoral
Regional
Coordination
Committees on
Health
Ukraine Governmental Commission on
managing development and
implementation of AIDS related
countermeasures in Ukrainian
SSR (1991)
2002 -Coordination Council on
HIV/AIDS, TB & Drug
Addiction (2007)
-UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS
-UN Joint Technical Team
-National Council for HIV/AIDS &
TB (2007)
-Committee on HIV/AIDS & other
Socially Dangerous Diseases
(MoH)
-Steering Group for World Bank
Loan
-Regional &
municipal level
AIDS Coordination
Councils
-CSO Forum
(Odesa)
-Coordinating
Groups of Sites
(CGS)
-District Councils on
HIV/AIDS
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challenged effective governance of HIV/AIDS pro-
grammes [34,35,37-39]. For example, specific challenges
stemmed from individuals being members of multiple
coordination structures; according to a respondent in
Mozambique: ‘[It is] ineffective to have multiple coordina-
tion structures: the same donor is a member of CCM,
member of ICC and is also in the SWAp’. Problems were
reported in Ukraine, where multiple national and subna-
tional HIV/AIDS structures exist within a complex, frag-
mented system of public administrative bodies inherited
from the Soviet health system. The study revealed the
multiple HIV/AIDS-related structures to have poorly-
defined, delineated and overlapping objectives, functions
and responsibilities that continue to embrace public sec-
tor working practices: their work was neither transparent,
nor accountable, with no information about meetings
and decisions taken being made public.
In some cases the transience of coordination structures
has undermined their effectiveness. In the volatile politi-
cal environments of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, HIV/AIDS
coordination structures have been established (and abol-
ished) several times, creating programmatic delays and
confusion. Conversely, coordination efforts have bene-
fited from relatively stable, albeit increasingly complex,
coordination environments in Mozambique, Zambia and
Peru. In Mozambique the CCM secretariat continued to
exist as a separate entity, despite integration of the CCM
into the SWAp Health Partners Group. In Zambia, the
CCM has operated in parallel to the NAC and other
national coordination structures [30,31,39].
Global Fund CCMs were diverse and integrated in dif-
ferent ways and to greater or lesser extents with other
country structures, which demonstrates the Fund’se v o -
lution since the early years when CCMs were often
stand-alone structures and seen as being imposed [22].
The CCM was the principal national HIV/AIDS coordi-
nation structure in Peru and Georgia; it formed a NAC
sub-group (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan); it was integrated
within the Sectorwide Approach (SWAp) (Mozambi-
que); it was a separate entity with NAC secretariat sup-
port (Zambia); and it was a separate entity but with
substantial overlap of NAC membership (China)
[28-39]. However the studies suggest that most CCMs
continued not to perform the broad range of functions
outlined in the Global Fund guidelines such as oversight
and monitoring and evaluation: they primarily existed to
agree and sign Global Fund proposals, and met infre-
quently. In Zambia, USAID and the World Bank sat on
the CCM and PEPFAR provided technical assistance
and financial support to the NAC [30,31].
Participation and membership in national and
subnational structures
A major goal of HIV/AIDS coordination structures is to
promote multisectoral decision making, specifically to
involve non-health government departments and nongo-
vernmental actors. Earlier studies [11,46] and those
reported here show that GHIs have widened stakeholder
participation and engagement. World Bank supported
HIV/AIDS programmes have increased multisectoral
participation in Zambia, Kyrgyzstan and Mozambique,
and World Bank country offices have participated in
country structures in these countries, although not in
Ukraine [28-31,34,35,39]. Global Fund CCMs in particu-
lar have improved multisectoral decision making: the
Table 4: HIV/AIDS coordination structures in seven case study countries (Continued)
Zambia National HIV/AIDS Council
(NAC) (created 2000; made
legal by Parliament 2002)
2002 National HIV/AIDS Council
(NAC) (created 2000; made
legal by Parliament 2002)
- Cabinet Committee on HIV/AIDS
-Thematic/Technical Working
Groups
- CCM
- SWAp
- ZANARA
- CSO Networks: Zambia National
AIDS Network (ZNAN); Churches
Health Association of Zambia
(CHAZ)
-District AIDS Task
Forces (DATFs) &
District AIDS
Coordination
Advisors (DACAs)
-Provincial AIDS
Task Forces (PATFs)
& Provincial AIDS
Coordination
Advisors (PACA)
-Provincial
Development
Coordinating
Committee (PDCC)
- District
Development
Coordinating
Committee (DDCC)
-District Health
Management Team
(DHMT)
-Community AIDS
Task Forces (CATF)
* Year structure was established
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of the CCM had improved participation in decision
making across government departments (such as educa-
tion, criminal justice and social care) and/or involve-
ment of nongovernmental actors (Georgia, Peru,
Kyrgyzstan, China and Ukraine) [28,29,32-38].
Nevertheless the studies suggest that despite these
developments overall levels of participation and/or
engagement of non-health government departments and
nongovernmental actors in national and subnational
coordination structures remained relatively modest.
While no major groups were excluded from member-
ship of national coordination structures in Mozambique
and Zambia, in China, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Peru and
Ukraine non-health government departments were
either absent or had marginal engagement; indeed in
those countries HIV/AIDS tended to be viewed as a
Ministry of Health (MoH) responsibility reflecting the
commonly held discourse that HIV/AIDS is a health
rather than a broader social issue [28,29,32-39].
In the post-Soviet countries of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and
Ukraine, specialisation within the health system has inhib-
ited interaction between different parts of the system, and
between health and non-health departments [47]. Ukrai-
nian and Kyrgyz respondents reported that this continued
to undermine efforts to bridge divisions between AIDS,
TB, drug services and STI services, as well as between gov-
ernment health and social care services receiving Global
Fund HIV/AIDS grants [28,29,34,35]. Ukrainian respon-
dents noted that government institutional cultures and
management styles were resistant to change and there
were few incentives to shift professional boundaries. Fre-
quent changes among senior MoH managers in that coun-
try had undermined efforts to create partnerships across
government departments and with international partners.
In Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan high turnaround of individuals’
membership in national and subnational councils, reflect-
ing a volatile political context, was reported as disrupting
their functioning [28,29,34,35].
Similarly poor coordination between government
departments, between different levels of government and
poor internal coordination/communication within some
government agencies was also reported in China, although
the establishment of the CCM was reported as improving
government coordination around HIV/AIDS programmes.
Additionally, in Kyrgyzstan the position of the national
HIV/AIDS coordination structure had hindered attempts
at multisectoral decision-making: the structure was relo-
cated from Presidential to MoH level in 2008 [28,29]. As a
respondent suggested, this impacted on multisectoral
engagement in HIV/AIDS decision- making:
We tried really hard for a long time to make HIV/
AIDS problem to be recognised as a social problem
in our country. However, if the Secretariat is now by
the Ministry of Health, it means that HIV/AIDS
became the health problem again.
The studies suggest that all three GHIs have created
opportunities for CSO involvement in HIV/AIDS pro-
grammes through funding their activities, or insisting on
their inclusion in CCMs (Global Fund). The Mozambi-
que study reveals that the integration of the CCM within
the SWAp increased national level engagement of CSOs
and the private sector. Similarly the research in Zambia
found that CSOs have begun to play a significant role in
district coordination structures, and the World Bank,
through the Zambia National Response to HIV/AIDS
Project (ZANARA), supported community responses to
HIV/AIDS by financing community based organisations,
which also participate in District AIDS Task Forces and
Community AIDS Task Forces [30,31]. However, PEP-
FAR-funded implementers frequently remained outside
subnational structures and worked directly with NGOs.
Respondents believed that this led to inefficient use of
resources and duplication of services. Other studies have
also found significant progress in expanding the repre-
sentation of CSOs on NACs and Global Fund CCMs (for
which the NAC provides secretariat support) [41].
In Georgia the CCM membership was described as
too large to be manageable. Lead ministries had more
than one representative, while other ministries and
NGOs were poorly represented: the private sector, reli-
gious organisations and education were absent. In order
to address this problem the number of CCM members
was decreased from 46 to 30 and a rotation principle
introduced to manage civil society representation
whereby NGOs would elect their representative
annually, with two NGOs acting as permanent CCM
members. This approach also ameliorated some of the
problems of conflicts of interest among NGOs receiving
Global Fund grants [36].
However, in common with previous studies and
reviews [6,22,48], CSOs and vulnerable groups contin-
ued to play relatively limited roles in some coordination
structures even where they were formally members.
They were often absent from meetings and when pre-
sent their contributions to discussions were limited
compared to more major players such as the MoH
(China, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Zambia and Peru)
[28-35,37,38]. Multiple barriers to effective participation
were revealed in the GHIN studies, including:
￿ Competition for scarce resources at national and
subnational level that created distrust between country
organisations (including government departments and
nongovernmental implementers) and hence a substantial
disincentive to meaningful engagement in coordination
structures (Peru, Kyrgyzstan, Zambia and Ukraine);
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in strategic or political decision making;
￿ Limited financial resources and time to commit to
meetings including costs of travelling, and no financial
incentives such as per diems and honoraria to encou-
rage attendance (Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine);
￿ Insufficient time to contribute to proposals with
tight submission deadlines (Peru);
￿ Government officials at national and subnational
level selected CSOs to participate in coordination struc-
tures thereby excluding others (China) [28-35,37,38].
Country ownership of national and subnational
coordination
Unless coordination structures have authority and are
seen to be under country ownership, any decisions they
make may be ignored potentially leading to poor align-
ment of GHI and donor programmes with government
priorities. The studies explored the extent to which
donors were accountable to country coordination bodies
and the strength of leadership and political commitment
to HIV/AIDS programmes. In Peru and China the stu-
dies showed that NACs were able to make decisions
and to allocate resources to HIV/AIDS programmes. By
comparison national and particularly subnational struc-
tures in Zambia, Mozambique, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
had limited authority to make decisions or allocate
resources to HIV/AIDS programmes [28-31,34,35,39].
An important reason for this was that major donors
for HIV/AIDS programmes including PEPFAR contin-
ued to set priorities outside national and subnational
structures; and their participation in such structures was
seen as a formality. Donor interests continued to under-
mine country ownership and make coordinating multi-
ple aid programmes difficult for countries [2,49]. The
Kyrgyz, Ukrainian and Zambian studies reported that
donors including GHIs did not fully engage in coordina-
tion structures so as to maintain institutional visibility
and attribute impacts to the activities they had financed
[28-31,34,35]. This was reflected in donors’ unwilling-
ness to relinquish control of funds to national or subna-
tional coordination structures and to share information
with other partners. A respondent in Zambia explained:
... most people, when you ask them where they were
working, they will tell you that they are working for
the [donor] funded project. It’s never a Zambian pro-
ject. So I would like to see a situation where it is...
The logo on the vehicle should just say: the Zambian
national response to HIV/AIDS and not tell us where
the money is coming from.
In Zambia and Mozambique the studies found that
national coordination structures could not hold the
myriad of donors and implementers to account for the
effectiveness of their programmes, especially those
CSOs that received funding through other channels.
PEPFAR and the World Bank participated in NACs in
those countries, but PEPFAR recipients in Zambia had
limited engagement in subnational coordination struc-
tures. Limited decision making and resource allocation
powers have been particularly acute within subnational
structures, which in practice worked as implementers of
local programme determined at the national level rather
than as coordination bodies. Donors frequently bypassed
such structures. In Zambia government subnational
coordination structures, the District AIDS Task Forces,
have had a technical/coordination role rather than deci-
sion making or resource allocation powers: respondents
observed that there was no obligation for GHI-funded
NGOs to report to District AIDS Task Forces; they fre-
quently worked to their own priorities and did not par-
ticipate in them. As a consequence these structures
have had very limited control over donor activities and
those of international NGOs, and often had minimal
information on their activities including how PEPFAR
funds were being spent in their districts. Some infor-
mants suggested that donor funds were being allocated
to programmes which did not coincide with district
priorities, leading to service duplication [30,31]. One
respondent explained:
One of the challenges when a donor moves into the
district, you just see a donor is working there. All
they will say is we have been to the Ministry of
Health or Education, we got permission and we are
working here...
The positioning of coordination structures within the
wider public administration system has important impli-
cations for levels of country ownership and the authority
a structure can exercise. An important reason for posi-
tioning NACs under the Presidential Office in some
African countries has been to give the structures politi-
cal legitimacy and demonstrate political commitment
[42]. In Kyrgyzstan the national coordination structure
lost the authority that it had prior to 2008, when it was
directly responsible to the President’s Office. Subse-
quently, the secretariat, which reported to the MoH,
was perceived as having little authority, acting as little
more than ‘ap e t i t i o n e r ’ of information from member
agencies. Subnational coordination structures in Kyrgyz-
stan also lacked authority since NGOs were mainly
accountable to donors on whom they were highly
dependent. They were not financed through government
budgets and/or coordination structures, making them
more aligned to donor requirements. In practice NGOs
were not obliged to report to these structures, thereby
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local programmes [28,29].
Similarly in Ukraine the NAC has had an advisory
rather than a decision-making function and met only to
a g r e eG l o b a lF u n dp r o p o s a l s ,a tw h i c hp o i n ti tw a s
labelled a CCM. Subnational structures had very limited
decision making power and minimal influence over local
budgets for HIV/AIDS programmes [34,35]. A respon-
dent suggested that the national structure had:
... the status of an advisory institution; that is it
doesn’t make any decisions... the Coordination Coun-
cil should help coordination. And this is what they
don’t do. They meet, review issues, make decisions
which are often not implemented.
In Zambia, Peru, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan subnational
HIV/AIDS coordination structures were seen as particu-
larly weak and as reinforcing centralised decision-mak-
ing. In Peru respondents reflected on the limited input
from subnational stakeholders in preparing Global Fund
grant proposals since the need to draft the proposal
rapidly made broad participation and consultation from
subnational stakeholders impossible. In Zambia there
were mixed views from respondents about whether in
practice planning was top-down (from the NAC to the
district level) or bottom-up. According to the Zambian
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework, it was yet to
be established how the NAC should communicate with
lower level structures and the flow of information to
NAC from structures at lower levels was not yet clearly
outlined. In Ukraine respondents saw the creation of
subnational coordination structures as imposed from the
national level and/or international donors, and that their
decision-making powers to shape programmes and allo-
cating resources were limited. Regional HIV/AIDS coor-
dination committees were a requirement under the
terms of the Global Fund grant, although the grant was
n o tu s e dt of u n dt h e i re s t a b l i s h m e n to rr e c u r r e n tc o s t s
[28-35]. A respondent explained:
... as a whole this system is still bureaucratic, vertical
[structures] are created... those coordination councils
are created down to the bottom, but everything is like
it’s used to be. Meetings, conferences, happy reports,
everything is done, but the epidemic is spreading...
Leadership and political commitment
Leadership invested by key members of coordination
bodies and commitment of high-level government lea-
ders are important factors in controlling HIV/AIDS epi-
demics in countries [50]. Although a number of early
studies suggested NACs lacked consistent leadership
[51-53], our findings show improvements and good
practice in other settings. In China government leader-
ship of the NAC was strong. In some districts, for
example Duyun and Guizhou, local government had a
strong oversight role and had strengthened coordination
structures leading to improved local programmes,
although in other districts leadership was weak.
The Georgian CCM benefited from the strong leader-
ship of the First Lady, resulting in improved attendance,
coordination between ministries, and expedited deci-
sion-making. Kyrgyzstan reported committed leadership
in some regional coordination structures, although in
practice leadership was vulnerable to rapid turnover of
members. Strong leadership was also observed in
Mozambique and Zambia. Only in Peru was it reported
that weak leadership had undermined the NAC’s perfor-
mance [28-33,36,39].
Political commitment is illustrated in different ways.
In Peru a ‘Declaration of political commitment to HIV/
AIDS’ raised the profile of the disease, and invoked
greater multisectoral commitment than previously.
However, no formal policy on coordination or partner-
ship existed, which limited progress. In China the gov-
ernment obligated ministries and local government
departments to establish coordination structures and
engage with issues of HIV/AIDS. Commitment to coor-
dinated working was found in the Zambian National
HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework 2006 - 2010 and the
Joint Assistance Strategy; and in Kyrgyzstan a number
of government policies explicitly call for multisectoral
and CSO engagement in HIV/AIDS control
[30-33,37,38].
The Ukrainian study revealed variable levels of com-
mitment from local government administrations to
HIV/AIDS, which had impaired the effectiveness of
coordination structures [34,35]. However, the introduc-
tion of HIV/AIDS coordinators in some regions
financed by Global Fund HIV/AIDS grants strengthened
leadership, improved local commitment and facilitated
more effective coordination. Similar posts were created
in some districts of Zambia with United Nations Devel-
opment Program funding, although it was difficult for
them to operate due to erratic funding from the NAC
for DATFs which they coordinate [30,31].
Capacity, roles and communication
Low capacity of secretariats in terms of experience, sal-
aries and equipment, and limited clarity about roles
among coordination structure members can undermine
the working of these bodies [20]. Putzel notes that in
some African countries NACs have been ill-informed
and poorly motivated, and this was borne out in some
of the studies reported here [24]. In Zambia, Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan, international donors did not allocate
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countries experienced problems stemming from the lim-
ited capacity of their secretariats. In Kyrgyzstan, respon-
dents noted several problems, including changes in the
Country Multi-Sectoral Coordination Committee (the
n a t i o n a ls t r u c t u r ew i t har e m i tf o rH I V / A I D S )t h a tl e d
to secretariat staff being replaced. This meant that new
secretariat staff were not sufficiently trained and were
under resourced in terms of premises, equipment, and
access to the internet, office supplies and salaries
[28-31,34,35].
In Kyrgyzstan, China and Ukraine, respondents
reported that Global Fund funding had engendered bet-
ter communication and transparency between partners
and improved clarity of roles and responsibilities
[28,29,34,35,37,38]. For example in China the Global
Fund programme had promoted greater attention on
effective communication and cooperation between local
government departments through regular meetings and
jointly run programmes under the leadership of local
CDCs. Ukrainian respondents saw the creation of the
CCM as offering a model of cooperation and transpar-
ency between governmental and nongovernmental orga-
nisations that was starting to be taken up more broadly.
According to one respondent:
The Global Fund helped the coordination council
understand more clearly and accept international
procedures, the procedures of openness, open deci-
sion- making, transparency, because the Global Fund
influenced indirectly the composition of the National
council.
A lack of clarity over division of roles and responsibil-
ities among coordination structure members was
reported in a number of countries (China, Kyrgyzstan,
Peru and Zambia). Poorly defined roles among NAC
members in Peru delayed the implementation of the
Global Fund grant, and in Zambia roles and responsibil-
ities were ill-defined between the NAC, MoH, other
ministries and CSOs, and between various subnational
structures and actors [30,31]. In Kyrgyzstan agreed
working procedures were lacking, and the restructuring
of the country HIV/AIDS coordination structure to
encompass ‘socially dangerous diseases’ (infectious dis-
eases in humans and livestock) resulted in a loss of
clarity over the structure’sr o l ea n df o c u s[ 2 8 , 2 9 ] .I l l u s -
trating this issue a Kyrgyz respondent commented on
the lack of focus of the current structure:
The time of people, who are members of Country
Multisectoral Coordination Committee is very ‘expen-
sive’. And when I see that the agenda includes discus-
sion of issues related to animal health, and only one
of the three issues is related to HIV and my work, I
ask myself, do I really need to go to this meeting?
Only in Mozambique did the country study suggest
that roles were clearly defined among members of
national coordination structures, in particular after the
SWAp structure was streamlined in 2007.
Evidence of limited information flows within and
between coordination structures was a key finding in
most of the countries, which undermined meaningful
exchange between members. While there had been con-
siderable improvements in transparency between subna-
tional actors in Zambia, PEPFAR and NGOs funded by
the initiative were unwilling to share information with
District AIDS Task Forces, which undermined their
authority. However, those CSOs that did participate in
these Task Forces were credited with improving com-
munication sharing at district level [30,31].
In Kyrgyzstan limited formal coordination existed at
all levels, and in the Ukraine working practices were
neither transparent nor accountable. While Kyrgyz sta-
keholders reported that some local coordination coun-
cils fostered improvements in informal information
exchange, limited formal communication continued to
exist at all levels, and there remained a lack of transpar-
ency among actors [28,29]. Speaking about the national
coordination structure a respondent said:
At Country Multisectoral Coordination Committee
meetings we cannot possibly get detailed information
concerning... what and how much funds have been
spent. We asked for this information so many times
already, but all our attempts failed. We just receive
general reports back...
Competition for scarce resources at national and sub-
national level in Peru, Kyrgyzstan, Zambia, Mozambique
and Ukraine was reported as creating distrust between
country actors. Nevertheless World Bank HIV/AIDS
programmes in Zambia and Mozambique have provided
capacity support to the NAC secretariats, and are cred-
ited with improving transparency and communications
[28-35,39].
Discussion
Towards programmatic coordination?
The empirical evidence collected in these seven countries
provides a kaleidoscope of experience and throws light on
country systems and their responses to GHIs. There is
huge contextual and historical diversity within and
between countries, although what is striking about these
findings is that countries with very different contexts
shared similar experiences of problematic coordination
and the effects of GHIs: findings in Zambia and
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high levels of HIV/AIDS financing, were similar to those
in the low and concentrated HIV/AIDS epidemic coun-
tries of Europe, Asia and Latin America. In common
across the seven countries is the finding that the GHIs - in
particular the Global Fund - have had many positive
effects on national level coordination. The evidence is that
substantial new funding for HIV/AIDS control, for which
GHIs can take most of the credit, has created opportu-
nities for multisectoral participation, promoted greater
political commitment and increased transparency among
most partners.
However, refractory problems reported in earlier stu-
dies [11,46] still existed in 2006-08. These included the
complexity of aid architecture relating to HIV/AIDS
p r o g r a m m e si na l ls e v e nc o u n t r i e s ,e v e ni nt h el o wa n d
concentrated epidemic countries where levels of finan-
cing are substantially lower than in the generalised epi-
demic African countries: such a trend is clearly at odds
with the Three Ones principle of establishing a single
national AIDS coordination authority. Donor fashions
and attachment to their own procedures, especially in
monitoring and evaluation, and patchy accountability to
country-led structures were also substantial problems.
Donor practices continued to undermine consistent
alignment with country priorities and processes and
lacked harmonisation among themselves [54,55] despite
many internal and external evaluations [11,22-24,46,54].
Moreover, donor-generated competition for resources
leading to reluctance to share information impaired
local oversight of programmes and delivery systems
thereby undermining monitoring and evaluation and the
application of evidence at national and subnational
levels to improve programme delivery. Systemic weak-
nesses in countries’ national and subnational coordina-
tion structures were undermining the goals of the GHIs.
The new knowledge that this cross-country synthesis
has begun to generate is that it is at the subnational
level that the biggest gap between intent and practice
was found in 2006-08. This is a particularly problematic
trend. It contradicts the growing emphasis on decentra-
lised health sector decision-making that is seen as
strengthening the powers of local-level actors in the for-
mulation and implementation of policies and pro-
grammes, thereby increasing responsiveness to local
needs [56]. The studies revealed that early and refrac-
tory problems at the national level - including coordina-
tion structure proliferation, lack of ownership and
capacity, and poor communication - were being repli-
cated at subnational levels. The studies in Zambia, Peru,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan revealed that problems of lim-
ited decision-making and resource allocation powers
were particularly acute within subnational structures
[28-35]. Indeed weak subnational coordination was seen
as reinforcing centralised decision-making. In practice
they functioned as overseers of government-funded and/
o rG l o b a lF u n dp r o g r a m m e st h a tw e r ed e s i g n e da tt h e
national level; or of donor programmes, including PEP-
FAR, which sidelined them. These findings accord with
previous evaluations of the Global Fund in Ethiopia and
Benin where programmatic planning was initially top-
down and conflicted with national policies and processes
for decentralisation [57,58].
Many PEPFAR recipient organisations in Zambia did
not participate in subnational coordination structures
including District AIDS Task Forces, which conse-
quently had little control over these programmes
[30,31]. Subnational structures also lacked information
on programmes run by other donors or international
CSOs. Similarly, subnational coordination structures in
Kyrgyzstan lacked authority primarily because CSOs
working in HIV/AIDS were not financed by - and were
therefore not accountable to - these structures [28,29].
CSOs often did not inform them about their work,
undermining their ability to coordinate activities,
because they saw themselves as accountable to the Glo-
bal Fund Principal Recipient and other donors on whom
they depended for funding. This made them more
aligned to donor priorities than to those set by national
or local government. In Ukraine respondents saw the
creation of subnational coordination structures as
imposed from the national level and as having limited
authority [34,35].
Given these tensions, it is not surprising that coordi-
nated HIV/AIDS programmes remain a distant goal for
many countries. These studies suggest that poorly func-
tioning coordination structures undermine programma-
tic coordination, including weak multisectoral decision
making, poor levels of oversight and monitoring and
evaluation, poor alignment between GHI and donor pro-
grammes and national and subnational level priorities,
and implementation problems including delays and con-
fusion, inefficient use of resources and duplication of
services. The Global Fund, PEPFAR and the World
Bank have made an immense contribution to reducing
the burden of HIV/AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa. A clear lesson from these country studies is that
GHIs and other donors, as well as national governments,
now need to acknowledge and address the residual pro-
blems in national level coordination and focus more
attention and resources on strengthening subnational
coordination, if the gap between intent and practice is
to be narrowed.
There are a number of limitations of the studies
drawn on as part of this analysis. Firstly, much of the
data focus on the Global Fund, which is present in all
seven countries and has transparent processes, which
made data collection easier. Less information on World
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Ukraine and Zambia) and PEPFAR (Mozambique and
Zambia) reflects difficulties in accessing data, and/or
patchy engagement by these GHIs in coordination struc-
tures in some countries. It is therefore more difficult to
g e n e r a l i s ea b o u tt h ee f f e c t so ft h eW o r l dB a n kH I V /
AIDS programmes and PEPFAR than about the Global
Fund. Secondly, less data area v a i l a b l eo ns u b n a t i o n a l
coordination than national coordination since subna-
tional interviews were not part of the study design in
Peru, Mozambique, and Georgia, although national
interviewees commented on subnational coordination in
Peru. Thirdly, the findings are based on qualitative
interview data. Much less documentary evidence was
available to corroborate these data, although country
teams endeavoured to triangulate interview data to
boost the validity of findings. Finally, while studies
explored common themes, there was some heterogeneity
across the studies in terms of the precise questions
interviewees were asked.
Conclusions
T h ee v i d e n c es u g g e s t st h a ta l ls e v e nc o u n t r i e sa r ef a r
from realising the UNAIDS ‘Three Ones’ principle of
one multi-sectoral national body for HIV/AIDS coordi-
nation. National as well as subnational coordination
structures with a remit for HIV/AIDS are proliferating,
and in some countries the multiplicity of parallel coordi-
nation structures has challenged the effective govern-
ance of HIV/AIDS programmes.
GHIs are having some positive effects on HIV/AIDS
coordination structures, as well as a number of negative
effects: while much has been achieved, particularly at
national level, many serious problems remain. For
instance GHIs have widened stakeholder participation in
coordination structures, although engagement from non-
health government departments and civil society remains
modest. Country ownership of national and subnational
coordination is undermined by the weak decision making
authority of many coordination structures and limited or
perfunctory engagement among GHIs and other donors,
particularly at the subnational level. There is evidence
that strong leadership within coordination structures and
broad political commitment to coordinated approaches
to HIV/AIDS programmes have been improving,
although weak secretariat capacity, poorly defined roles
and responsibilities among members of coordination
structures, limited transparency and communications
and competition for scarce resources remain persistent
problems undermining effective coordination.
Despite the many problems of coordination revealed
above, there are several practical lessons stemming from
the studies that decision-makers in these and other
countries might bear in mind when seeking to
strengthen the functioning of national and subnational
coordination structures. These include the need to aug-
ment the capacity of secretariats of both national and
subnational coordination structures through financial
and technical support, and to carefully consider how
best to position a national coordination structure within
the public administration system in order to boost its
authority and ability to promote multisectoral working.
Financial support for CSOs could promote their effec-
tive participation in national and subnational coordina-
tion structures by enabling them to attend meetings.
Other forms of support for CSOs might also be appro-
priate such as providing training in strategic or political
decision making so that they are better able to engage
in coordination meetings and more fully contribute to
discussions. Clarity about roles and functions was often
missing from the examples presented above reinforcing
the need to develop and agree terms of reference for the
objectives, functions and working practices of national
and subnational coordination structures, and to define
the roles and responsibilities of individual members.
Several knowledge gaps remain: follow-up research
would be especially valuable in helping to better under-
stand how the functioning of coordination structures
plays out in the effective coordination of health inter-
ventions at the programmatic level, including coordi-
nated service delivery. In particular, further research
could help understand the functioning of subnational
coordination structures and their effects on programma-
tic coordination since the evidence at subnational level
from these and other studies remains weaker than that
at national level. Moreover, at present most evidence is
based on qualitative data collection: it will be important
to build a stronger evidence base derived from both
qualitative, as well as robust quantitative, measures to
demonstrate the effectiveness of coordination structures
and their effects on programmatic coordination.
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